omniscience, omnipresence, perfect goodness and eter-
nity. Much philosophical discussion has gone into the ex-
plication of these attributes, their defence against atheistic
objections, and arguing for the existence of a being that
possesses them. One of the other attributes traditionally
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ascribed to God is divine simplicity. In its strongest form
the doctrine of divine simplicity asserts that each of God s
attributes is identical with each of his attributes, and
that God himself is identical with this attribute. In other
words, God is his nature. Indeed, on this approach it may
seem as if the very word nature is inappropriate when
we are talking of God. Many modern philosophers (such
as Alvin Plantinga), however, see no need to embrace the
doctrine of divine simplicity in such a strong form, in-
sisting that our intuitions about the unity of the divine
nature can be satisfied by thinking of a single attribute,
such as maximal greatness, as somehow determining the
other, distinct, attributes.
See eternity; goodness, perfect; nature; omnipotence;
omnipresence; omniscience; simplicity, divine; theology,
creation; theology, natural; theology, perfect-being
Further reading: Hill, Daniel J. 2005; Kretzmann 1997;
Morris 1991; Swinburne 1993a; Wierenga 1989
goodness, perfect: God s perfect goodness is his being unsur-
passable in morality. Sometimes this is called omnibenev-
olence , but that label would seem rather to refer to the
different doctrine that God is benevolent in every way to
every one. Obviously discussions of God s perfect good-
ness inherit the general problems of discussions in ethics.
A deontologist, for example, would tend to define God s
perfect goodness as that he always does the best action
(because it is the best action) if there is one, and if there
isn t one then he does a good action (because it is a good
action) if there is one, and he never does a bad action. A
virtue ethicist would claim that God s perfect goodness
consists in his having the greatest possible combination
of virtues. A consequentialist would claim that God al-
ways actualises the best possible state of affairs (because
it is the best one) if there is one, and if there isn t one
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CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY A Z 77
then he actualises a good one (because it is a good one)
if there is one, and he never actualises a bad one. Per-
fect goodness, however, is usually held to go beyond this
and to have a modal component, such that God s perfect
goodness consists in its being impossible for him to be
less than good. Various questions then arise in connection
with this assertion that God cannot sin: (1) can he then
be truly praiseworthy for not sinning? (2) does this not
compromise his perfect freedom or aseity? (3) is this con-
sistent with God s omnipotence? Christian philosophers
have devoted much time to discussing these questions;
the most plausible answer to (1) and (2) seems to be that
God s perfect goodness is something from within his own
nature, rather than an external constraint, and that this
does not compromise his freedom or praiseworthiness.
The question about omnipotence has traditionally been
answered by denying that sinning is an action of the kind
with which power is concerned.
See aseity; ethics; omnipotence
Further reading: Hill, Daniel J. 2005; Morris 1991
grace: God s grace is his undeserved favour. Christian philoso-
phers disagree about whether in order to be perfectly
good God must dispense his grace equally to all. The
Calvinist/Augustinian tradition claims that God does not
give all his grace equally to all he gives his saving grace
to the elect only, and it is by itself sufficient to effect
their salvation. In contrast, the Arminian tradition up-
holds the view that saving grace is distributed equally to
all or, at least, all that hear the gospel; saving grace is,
however, for the Arminian not sufficient in itself to effect
salvation. Calvinist philosophers wrestle with the objec-
tion that on their view God s grace overrides free will;
Arminian philosophers wrestle with the objection that
their view underplays God s sovereignty. Most Christian
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78 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY A Z
philosophers do, however, agree that God s grace is pri-
mary in salvation, and humans merely respond to it.
See Augustinianism; Calvinism
Further reading: Edwards, Jonathan 1971; Garrigou-
Lagrange 1939; Helm 1993; Oman 1931; Pinnock 1975
and 1989; Pinnock, Rice, Sanders, Hasker and Basinger
1994
great-making property see property, great-making
greater-good defence see defence, greater-good
greatness, maximal: Maximal greatness is a technical term
roughly corresponding to absolute perfection . The dif-
ference is twofold: (1) a being that is absolutely perfect is
generally held to have every great-making property to the
highest degree, whereas a being that is maximally great
is generally held only to be such that no possible being
is greater (thus allowing for it to be impossible to have
every great-making property to the highest degree); and
(2) it is generally held that, by definition, there can be only
one absolutely perfect being, whereas it is not true by def-
inition that there can be only one maximally great being.
See property, great-making
Further reading: Hill, Daniel J. 2005; Morris 1991
guilt, original see sin
H
hard-fact/soft-fact debate: The debate among Christian
philosophers over hard facts and soft facts is bound up
with the problem of foreknowledge and freedom. There
is not even agreement among Christian philosophers as
to the definition of the terms hard fact and soft fact ,
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CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY A Z 79
however, let alone as to the existence of these facts. The in-
tuition behind the distinction is that there are some facts
that obtain entirely in virtue of the state of the world
at one single time (hard facts), and there are other facts [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]