Especially since the opposition, during the
decisive period, may well manage to coor-
dinate its actions for a given time, which is
what the American and Pakistani military
circles have been persistently urging them
to do. Certain apprehensions also arise due
to the fact that there is still no real unity
within the PDPA, and factional, tribal, and
other disagreements remain. Impulsiveness
and memories of past “injustices” are trans-
parent in the thinking of some Afghan lead-
ers. Feeble, to say the least, are the actions
of prime minister M.H. Sharq and many
ministers in his cabinet.
A most serious factor remains the fact
that violations of the Geneva accords by
Islamabad have acquired not just an open,
but a flagrant character. Pakistani
borderguards are directly participating in
military operations on Afghan territory.
Bombardments of bordering regions of Af-
ghanistan are taking place, arms flow con-
tinuously, and armed bands are crossing over
from Pakistan. As before, the headquarters
of the Afghan opposition parties, their train-
ing centers and bases continue to function
unimpeded in Peshawar and other cities. All
of this is done by inertia [concerning poli-
cies] established under Zia-ul-Haq. It is un-
likely that B[enazir]. Bhutto is in a position
to change the situation in the near future.
Both we and Afghanistan have been
continuously, in a decisive manner, and cit-
ing concrete facts, condemning and continue
to condemn such actions of the Pakistani
government. Such a line is meant to be con-
tinued also in the future, including in the
UN Security Council as well as in contacts
with the Pakistani government itself.
1. The chief question on which de-
pends the continuing evolution of the situa-
tion boils down to this: will the government
be able to maintain Kabul and other large
cities in the country, though above all the
capital? The situation in Kabul is difficult;
indeed, the main problems are not even mili-
tary, but economic. It is very clear that the
opposition plans to organize an economic
blockade of Kabul, close off its supply of
foodstuffs and petroleum products, and pro-
voke discontent and even direct insurgence
of the populace. Already, such a blockade
is virtually being carried out by the forces
of the opposition in the form of highway
robberies and intimidation and bribery of
drivers of Afghan ground-based freight ve-
hicles destined towards Kabul. It should be
pointed out that the present complications
with flour and foodstuffs in general in Kabul
are to a significant degree related to the fact
that the directive to inflict defeat on Ahmad
Shah, whose detachments present the great-
est threat to the road between Kabul and
Hairaton, was not carried out when the time
was ripe.
At the present time, just the monthly
requirement of flour in Kabul is around 15
thou. tons. Recently, several thousand tons
of flour were delivered by Soviet motor and
air transport. However, it is imperative to
have stored provisions for at least 2-3
months, which would be controlled by the
President and which would give the Afghan
friends the possibility of feeling secure in
this matter.
Since such large stores can be created
only with the help of motor transport, we
are talking about getting flour and other
foodstuffs through the Hairaton-Kabul high-
way. In the words of comr. Najibullah, if
the road remains functionally secured until
May, the survival of the regime is guaran-
teed. Evidently, the Afghan friends will not
be able to secure the normal functioning of
the road without our help. We must pro-
ceed from the fact that a break in the func-
tioning of the Hairaton-Kabul highway can-
not be allowed. In addition, special atten-
tion will have to be paid to the most vulner-
able section of the highway, which is the
Salang pass with its more than three kilo-
meter-long tunnel.
In preparation for the delivery of such
assistance it is necessary, during the remain-
ing time, to intensify through all channels
the condemnation of the actions of the op-
position, which is obstructing the delivery
of foodstuffs to Kabul and other large Af-
ghan cities; moreover, one should lay stress [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]